Game Theory Applications: Navigating Strategic Decisions

What has been corrected on this page?

Every accepted correction to this page is recorded with the exact change, so readers can see how the page improved over time.

1. 28 July 2026 · corrected by Emir Baycan

   Corrected six factual and attribution errors: the 1950 Flood-Dresher experiment was a 100-round repeated game with frequent cooperation, not one-shot mutual defection; Nash's existence theorem guarantees an equilibrium only when mixed (randomized) strategies are allowed (pure equilibria are not guaranteed); the 1973 Nature ESS result is due to Maynard Smith and Price, with Dawkins's role being later popularization (1976); the Nash bargaining solution maximizes the product of gains over disagreement payoffs rather than yielding a split proportional to relative improvement over outside options; trembling-hand perfection is Selten's (Harsanyi's contribution was games of incomplete information); and the Henrich et al. 2001 study covered fifteen small-scale societies with substantial variation, not dozens of cultures with a regular 20-30% rejection rule.

   What the page claimed

   The article stated that neither Flood-Dresher player cooperated, that every finite game has a Nash equilibrium (without the mixed-strategy condition), that Dawkins/Maynard Smith/Price showed ESS in 1973, that Nash bargaining predicts a proportional surplus split, that Harsanyi developed trembling-hand perfection, and that Henrich et al. studied dozens of cultures establishing regular rejection below 20-30%.

   What was corrected

   Corrected each to the established record: repeated-game cooperation in Flood-Dresher; mixed-strategy condition on Nash existence; Maynard Smith and Price for the 1973 ESS paper with Dawkins as later populariser; product-maximization for Nash bargaining; Selten for trembling-hand perfection; and fifteen small-scale societies with substantial variation for Henrich et al. 2001.

   Why: These are verifiable errors of historical result, mathematical characterization, authorship, and study scope, corrected against the primary literature rather than by substituting new unverified sources.

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2. 11 July 2026 · corrected by Emir Baycan

   Correct name (John Maynard Keynes) and attribution: Keynes gave the metaphor; the formal p-beauty contest game is due to Moulin, tested by Nagel.

   Before

   The p-beauty contest experiment, designed by economist John Keynes and tested extensively by Nagel (1995)

   After

   The p-beauty contest experiment, inspired by the beauty-contest metaphor of economist John Maynard Keynes, formally introduced as a game by Herve Moulin (1986), and tested extensively by Nagel (1995)

   Why: Verified live: the correction was already applied to the article body exactly as suggested, and the FAQ/excerpt/meta fields contained no leftover reference to the fabrication. No further action needed.

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