Communication Clarity Checklist

What is this page about?

A practical 14-point checklist for communicating clearly, grouped into stages: before you communicate (purpose, audience, one key message), structuring the message (main point upfront, logical structure, concrete detail), language and tone (cutting or defining jargon), verification and feedback (confirming understanding, explicit action items), and medium selection. It opens with two cautionary cases, NASA's Mars Climate Orbiter, lost to a units mismatch, and the finding that communication failures underlie a large share of serious medical errors, and closes with how teams can share communication standards across remote and asynchronous work.

What has been corrected on this page?

Every accepted correction to this page is recorded with the exact change, so readers can see how the page improved over time.

1. 29 July 2026 · corrected by Selen Ikbal Uslu

   Corrected relabeled/unverified EIU statistics, an inaccurately-described Byron study with an unverified stat, a wrong year and unverified detail on Dunbar's research, wrong author order/affiliation for Epley/Kruger, a wrong year for Haig et al.'s SBAR paper, entirely unverified Kaiser Permanente figures, an entirely unverified Lockheed Martin/GAO case study, and an unverified Amazon/Eisenmann statistic.

   What the page claimed

   Article relabeled real Economist Intelligence Unit survey categories (swapping which percentage applied to which outcome) and added an unverified '2.4 million' cost figure with no real source. It described Kristin Byron's real 2008 Academy of Management Review paper as an empirical 'comprehensive review' with a '50 percent' finding, when it is actually a theoretical model paper with no such statistic. It misdated Robin Dunbar's real 1997 Human Nature paper as 1998 and added an unverified 'across 38 different cultures' detail to a study that was actually based on eavesdropping in English-speaking public spaces. It reversed the author order of Kruger, Epley, Parker & Ng's real 2005 study and incorrectly stated both lead authors were at the University of Chicago (Kruger was at NYU Stern). It misdated Haig, Sutton & Whittington's real SBAR paper from 2006 to 2010 and added an unverifiable '67 percent' statistic. It included an unverified Kaiser Permanente adoption details (37 hospitals in 2004, specific callback/error-rate figures) that don't match the real history of SBAR's development within Kaiser Permanente Colorado. It included an unverified entire Lockheed Martin F-35 case study with unverified GAO-attributed figures that don't appear in any real GAO report. And it attributed an unverified '34 percent fewer follow-up meetings' statistic to a nonexistent 2019 Tom Eisenmann Harvard Business Review article about Amazon's real narrative-memo practice.

   What was corrected

   EIU passage corrected to accurately reflect the real survey's category labels without the unverified cost figure. Byron passage corrected to accurately describe her paper as a theoretical model, not an empirical review with an unverified statistic. Dunbar passage corrected to the real 1997 year and the real observational methodology. Epley/Kruger passage corrected to the real author order and removed the incorrect shared-affiliation claim. Haig et al. passage corrected to the real 2006 year without the unverifiable statistic. Kaiser Permanente passage rewritten to describe the real history of SBAR's development within Kaiser Permanente Colorado rather than unverified adoption figures. The entire unverified Lockheed Martin/GAO case study was removed. The Amazon/Eisenmann unverified statistic was replaced with an accurate general statement about the real narrative-memo practice's purpose.

   Why: This was one of the most heavily unverified tail sections found in this batch - 8 of 10 checked claims needed correction, ranging from wrong years and author ordering on otherwise-real papers to two entirely unverified case studies (Lockheed Martin/GAO, Amazon/Eisenmann) and one set of unverified adoption statistics grafted onto a real institution's real practice (Kaiser Permanente/SBAR). By contrast, the Joint Commission's 80% communication-failure statistic, the Alan Mulally/Ford anecdote, and Gawande's real 36%/47% surgical checklist figures (spot-checked separately) were all verified fully accurate.

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2. 11 July 2026 · corrected by Emir Baycan

   Curse of knowledge was named by Camerer, Loewenstein & Weber (1989); the Heaths only popularized it

   Before

   The curse of knowledge is the cognitive bias identified by Chip and Dan Heath that makes it difficult

   After

   The curse of knowledge is the cognitive bias named by economists Colin Camerer, George Loewenstein, and Martin Weber (and popularized by Chip and Dan Heath) that makes it difficult

   Why: Verified already correctly fixed on the live site (body content and bibliography). FAQ mention is a generic unattributed one-liner definition with no author names to correct. No further action needed.

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Who checked this page?

2 contributors have checked "Communication Clarity Checklist" on When Notes Fly. Each name below links to that person's public CitePep profile, where every contribution they have made is listed with the exact change they proposed.